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Abstract 
 
This paper analyzes the extent to which the effectiveness of capital controls in India have 
changed over time. We begin by calculating deviations from covered interest parity 
utilizing data from the 3-month offshore non-deliverable rupiah forward (NDF) market. 
Then, using the self-exciting threshold autoregression methodology, we estimate a no-
arbitrage band whose boundaries are determined by transactions costs and by the 
effectiveness of capital controls. Inside the bands, small deviations from CIP follow a 
random walk process. Outside the bands, profitable arbitrage opportunities exist and we 
estimate an adjustment process back towards the boundaries. We identify three distinct 
periods, and estimate the model over each sub-sample in order to capture the de facto 
effect of changes in capital controls over time. We find that de facto capital control 
barriers: (1) are asymmetric over inflows and outflows, (2) have changed over time from 
primarily restricting outflows to effectively restricting inflows; (3) arbitrage activity 
closes deviations from CIP when the threshold boundaries are exceeded in all sub-
samples. In recent years, capital controls have been more symmetric over capital inflows 
and outflows and the deviations from CIP outside the boundaries are closed more 
quickly.   
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1. Introduction 
In the 1980s, India began to liberalize its economy to increase its market 
orientation. Market-oriented reforms were expanded beginning in 1991, after a balance of 
payments crisis and a rapid economic expansion supported by expansionary fiscal policy 
and current account deficits. Key components of the reforms were removal of 
government licensing controls on domestic industrial activity and trade liberalization. 
Trade liberalization reduced tariffs dramatically and replaced quantitative trade 
restrictions with tariffs. 
 As a complement to the trade liberalization, effective current account 
liberalization, as measured by acceptance of IMF Article VIII, was achieved by August 
1994. However, Indian policy-makers have proceeded with caution in liberalizing capital 
flows as there is less theoretical agreement on the economic benefits of capital account 
liberalization, and in light of the recent externally-triggered financial crises in emerging 
economies. Various steps have been taken liberalize the capital account and to allow 
certain kinds of foreign capital flows, but a host of restrictions and discretionary controls 
remain. In fact, according to the popular Chinn-Ito (2007) index of capital account 
openness, which relies on measured de jure controls, India remains one of the most 
closed economies on the capital account, having the second lowest score on the index in 
the year 2006.1  
In this paper we examine the de facto effects of India capital account 
liberalization evident in market price signals by measuring deviations from covered 
                                                 
1 China, Turkey, Pakistan and South Africa were other emerging markets that had the same score as India 
in 2006, the last for which Chinn-Ito rankings are available. Work on China that is related to our concern 
with de facto controls includes Cheung et al (2006) and Liu and Otani (2005). 
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interest parity (CIP) over time.2 An extensive literature investigates deviations from CIP, 
inferring market segmentation due to capital controls, transactions costs and other 
institutional impediments to arbitrage. Studies that have estimated deviations from CIP as 
an indication of international financial market integration in various contexts include 
Frenkel and Levich (1975), Peel and Taylor (2002), Obstfeld and Taylor (2004) and 
others. Our approach follows one strand of this literature by measuring a no-arbitrage 
band for small deviations from CIP where the upper and lower threshold points are 
determined by the intensity of capital controls and transaction costs. Within the bands, we 
expect deviations from CIP to be random walks, and outside the bands we expect 
arbitrage (profit opportunities) pressures to systemically return deviations to the band 
thresholds. We divide the sample into pre- and post-liberalization periods to examine the 
effects of liberalization on the threshold boundaries of the no-arbitrage band and speeds 
of adjustment. A narrowing of the bands over time is an indication of greater de facto 
capital account openness, as is an increase in the speed of adjustment to the band 
threshold points (indicating arbitrage acts more rapidly in returning the market closer to 
CIP). 
A central problem in estimating bands and adjustment speeds is that it requires a 
non-linear estimation methodology. We employ the self exciting threshold auto-
regressions (SETAR) methodology in order to obtain consistent estimates of the upper 
and lower threshold points of the no-arbitrage band, as well as estimates of the speeds of 
adjustment (possibly asymmetric) to the boundaries. The SETAR model is a particular 
class of piece-wise autoregressive models and may be seen as a parsimonious 
                                                 
2 The Chinn-Ito index, in contrast, is a de jure measure, and shows no movement for India over a relatively 
long period, making it inappropriate for our task. 
 3
approximation of a general non-linear autoregressive model (Hansen, 1999). Another 
distinguishing feature of our empirical work is to measure the CIP relationship using the 
net foreign interest rate from the implied yield derived from the off-shore non-deliverable 
forward rate (NDF) and the LIBOR dollar interest rate. The off-shore NDF rate is a 
market determined forward rate free of capital controls and the implied yield represents 
the net covered rate of return that would be available on Indian short-term financial 
instruments in the absence of capital controls. The domestic onshore rate to which the 
implied NDF yield in compared is the Mumbai Interbank Offer Rate (MIBOR). We 
considered one- and three-month maturities, but focused on the latter, as better capturing 
significant transaction volume. 3  
Ma et al. (2004) and Misra and Behera (2006) have examined variations in 
deviations from CIP arbitrage conditions in India over time using simple summary 
statistics and qualitative methods, but not with more formal statistical modeling. They 
find that smaller deviations from covered interest parity are an indication of greater 
capital account openness since the advent of India’s capital control liberalization. 
Pasricha (2008), investigating interest rate differentials, also finds that India is de facto 
more open than de jure measures such as the Chinn-Ito index suggest.  
The next section discusses the liberalization of capital controls in India and the 
development of the NDF market. Section 3 presents some summary and preliminary 
analysis of the data, including unit root tests, and investigates structural change in the 
speed by which deviations from CIP reduced in the context of linear autoregressive 
                                                 
3 Most inter-dealer transactions in the NDF market are concentrated in two- to six-month maturities, and we 
follow Ma et al. (2004) in focusing on the 3-month maturity. The data on NDF contracts is from 
Bloomberg and the MIBOR rates and sport rates are from Global Financial Database and LIBOR rates are 
from Federal Reserve Board’s online database.  
 4
models. Section 4 presents the SETAR non-linear model and reports our main empirical 
results, i.e. estimates of the upper and lower threshold points of the no-arbitrage bands 
and the speed of adjustment to bands. Section 5 presents our conclusions.   
 
2. Non-Deliverable Forward Markets and Covered Interest Parity 
2.1 Capital Account Liberalization in India 
While measures aimed at current account convertibility in India were 
implemented early in the reform process, there was concern about possible linkages 
between capital account and current account transactions, such as capital outflows 
masked as current account transactions through mis-invoicing.  As a result, certain 
foreign exchange regulations stayed in place, including requirements for repatriation and 
surrender of export proceeds (allowing some fraction to be retained in foreign currency 
accounts in India for approved uses), restrictions on dealers and documentation for 
selling foreign exchange for current account transactions, and various indicative limits on 
foreign exchange purchases to meet different kinds of current account transactions.4  
In 1997, a government-appointed committee on Capital Account Convertibility 
(CAC) provided a road map for liberalization of capital transactions. The committee’s 
report emphasized various domestic policy measures and changes in the institutional 
framework as preconditions for full CAC.  These included fiscal consolidation, low 
inflation, adequate foreign exchange reserves, and development of a more robust 
domestic financial system.  While the Asian crisis and subsequent contagion that spread 
through 1997-98 derailed the committee’s recommended timetable, significant 
                                                 
4 Jadhav (2003) provides a review of India’s experience with capital controls and capital account 
liberalization through 2002. In general, like the RBI, Jadhav is relatively cautious about the benefits of such 
liberalization, and sympathetic to a gradualist approach. 
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liberalization of the capital account occurred in the last decade, particularly with respect 
to inward foreign investment, aided in part by improved macroeconomic indicators and 
financial sector reform.  
As pointed out by Shah and Patnaik (2005), the easing of capital controls, 
particularly on portfolio inflows, has been a series of small changes, within a continuing 
web of detailed quantitative restrictions operated by the RBI.  Similar complex 
restrictions apply to FDI inflows. There are also restrictions on outflows, including 
external commercial borrowing, and these restrictions have fluctuated over time 
(sometimes easing, sometimes tightening). Furthermore, as noted by Shah and Patnaik 
(2005), foreign investment in bonds remains considerably restricted. Another feature of 
capital controls in India is that foreign entities sometimes have more leeway than 
domestic institutions in engaging in certain kinds of forward transactions. 
 
2.2 Non-Deliverable Forward Market 
A consequence of India's partial capital controls has been the development of a 
Non-Deliverable Forward (NDF) market. An NDF market develops when the onshore 
forward markets are either not developed or have restricted access (evidence of exposure 
requirements in the Indian case). These markets, which are located offshore – that is, in 
financial centers outside the country of the restricted currency – and involve contract 
settlement without delivery in the restricted currency, allow offshore agents with the 
restricted-currency exposures to hedge their exposures and speculators to take a position 
on the expected changes in exchange rates or exchange rate regimes. Also active in the 
NDF markets are arbitrageurs who have access to both forward markets. Volumes in the 
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NDF market increase with increasing interest or investment in the currency and with 
increasing restrictions on convertibility. When currencies are fully convertible, NDF 
markets are not observed.5  
The Indian rupee NDF market is most active in Singapore and Hong Kong, 
though there is also trading in places such as Dubai. The dominant players in this market 
are the speculators who want to take a position in the currency, and the arbitrageurs, 
mainly Indian exporters and importers who have access to both the onshore forward 
market6 and the NDF market (Misra and Behera, 2006). The NDF rate therefore, serves 
as an important indicator of the expected future exchange rate of the rupee.  This rate also 
implies a corresponding interest rate, which is called the NDF implied yield, calculated as 
follows: 
  1)1( $ −+= iS
Fr N , 
where S is the spot exchange rate of the US dollar in terms of rupee, FN is the NDF rate 
of a certain maturity and i$ is the interest rate on dollar deposits of corresponding 
maturity (LIBOR rates). Then, r is what the onshore yield would be, if there were no 
capital controls and if CIP held. The (annualized) difference between the actual onshore 
yield (i, the MIBOR rate for the corresponding maturity) and r is our measure of the 
covered interest parity differential.  
Without restrictions on capital flows between two countries, deviations from 
covered interest parity (CIP), which is basically a “no-arbitrage” condition, would be 
small and simply reflect transactions costs. Large and persistent positive onshore-
                                                 
5 Lipscomb (2005) provides a useful overview of NDF markets. 
6 In August 2008, the Reserve Bank of India allowed trading on a domestic currency futures exchange to 
begin. Prior to this innovation, trading for those permitted to do so was over-the-counter. Restrictions 
remain on participation in the exchange; for example, only Indian residents can participate. 
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offshore differentials (i-r), on the other hand, reflect effective stemming of capital 
inflows and a negative differential suggests an effective stemming of capital outflows. 
The speed with which deviations from CIP are eliminated is then an indicator of how 
effective that arbitrage is between the two markets, and therefore of how effective the 
capital controls are. 
As described by Shah and Patnaik (2005), Indian banking regulations restrict 
banks’ ability to arbitrage deviations from CIP. Although importers and exporters are 
allowed to use the onshore forward market (“permitted hedgers”), they do not themselves 
have the financial capabilities to arbitrage as financial institutions would if permitted to 
do so. Hence, deviations from CIP persist systematically.7 At the same time, if there are 
some arbitrage avenues for market participants, then the speed with which deviations 
from CIP are eliminated (or reduced) should be an indicator of how effective that 
arbitrage is in the actual working of the market. 
 
3. Preliminary Analysis of the Data 
Figure 1 shows the evolution of the annualized deviations from covered interest 
parity (CIP), as defined in the previous section, calculated for NDF contracts and interest 
rates of 3-month maturity. The graph shows weekly observations, as well as six-week 
moving averages, starting in January 1999 and ending in January 2008. Large and 
                                                 
7 If forward rates are determined primarily by expected future currency needs from importers and exporters, 
rather than by pure arbitrage by currency traders or others, the direction of deviation from CIP can be an 
indicator of market expectations with respect to future currency appreciation or depreciation. Shah and 
Patnaik (2005) give examples in India in 1993-94 and 1997-98 where expectations as implied by the 
direction of CIP deviation turned out to be incorrect. However, their regression analysis indicates that, 
barring some outlier events, expectations of the direction of currency movements as implied by CIP 
deviations have been correct on average. A related point is that variations in deviations from CIP may 
reflect changing relative risk premia for the two currencies. However, these risk premia are unobservable: 
our maintained hypothesis that the source of variation is changes in controls is consistent with the data and 
our estimated model. 
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persistent deviations from CIP are evident, indicating large transactions costs and the 
effectiveness of capital controls. At some points deviations from CIP exceed 400 basis 
points. This indicates that, in the absence of capital controls and transactions costs, an 
arbitrageur could have received over $40,000 USD per year for every $1 million USD of 
volume transacted, without investing any money. Deviations of this magnitude indicate 
that capital controls have affected these markets and hindered arbitrage and market 
integration. In addition, it appears that restrictions on capital outflows (negative 
deviations from CIP indicate that the MIBOR rate is lower than the offshore rate) are 
predominant during 1999-02, while restrictions on inflows are predominant from 2003 to 
mid-2005, and fluctuate since that time.  
While we will ultimately estimate a non-linear model, it is instructive to apply 
standard diagnostics to the data series, as a guide to the subsequent analysis. We 
recognize that these diagnostics are merely indicative, if the true model is non-linear. 
Nevertheless, we perceive a value to applying these familiar tools as a preliminary 
exercise. 
Table 1 contains the results of Augmented Dicky-Fuller (ADF) tests for evidence 
of unit root behavior in the CIP deviation series and the two component interest rate 
series (the MIBOR rate and the NDF-offshore implied yield). The results show that – as 
one might expect8 – the CIP differential series do not exhibit evidence of a unit root 
whereas the interest rate series do. The fact that the CIP series are stationary indicates 
that when the deviations get too large, arbitrage gradually reduce them towards zero. This 
very rough base line indicates that there limits to geographic market segmentation.  
                                                 
8 Of course, if the underlying series are subject to structural breaks or non-linearities, this could show up as 
a unit root (Taylor, 2001). 
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To get closer to a measure of the de facto strength of capital controls, and 
especially the evolution of the strength of capital controls over time, we analyze in Figure 
2 the speed at which CIP deviations tend back towards zero in the context of a linear 
autoregressive model. We estimate two-year rolling regressions measuring the AR(1) 
autoregressive parameter (and the +/-95% confidence bands) of the deviations from CIP.  
The AR(1) parameter of the CIP series is a measure of how fast the series converges to a 
constant, and when we measure it in a relatively short, two year window, we expect that 
it is a measure of the level of arbitrage activity during that period. An AR(1) parameter 
near one would indicate a near unit root process, where the time to adjust back to zero is 
nearly infinite, whereas a measurement near zero indicates nearly instantaneous 
adjustment. The level of arbitrage activity is likely to be a function of the costs to 
arbitrage, imposed by capital controls, and the profitability to arbitrage, which is 
proportional to the magnitude of the deviation.  
Figure 2 indicates substantial variation in arbitrage activity in this market, based 
on the behavior of the AR(1) parameter over time. The AR(1) parameters appear to 
exhibit a cyclical pattern consistent with the notion that larger deviations from CIP 
(thereby increasing the profitability to arbitrage) are associated with more rapid speed of 
adjustment towards zero, i.e. a lower AR(1) parameter. Three local minima in the AR(1) 
parameter are identified – early 2002, early 2005, and late 2007—that in turn correspond 
to periods of greatest deviation from CIP seen in Figure 1 (note that the AR(1) parameter 
measured in late 2007 would have come from a regression on the previous 104 weeks of 
data). This pattern suggests that arbitrage pressures have increased, with the AR(1) 
parameter declining towards the end of 2007. 
 10
The patterns we observe in these series point to the possibility that there are time-
varying levels of arbitrage that may increase as threshold levels of CIP violation are 
reached. They also suggest the possibility that the degree to which capital controls bind 
arbitrage activity may have relaxed over time. In particular, capital controls therefore 
appear to have become weaker over 2006-2007.  
The preliminary analysis above suggests that there may be non-linearities as well 
as structural breaks in the data. We do an initial test for non-linearities using the Tsay test 
(1989). The Tsay F-statistic equals 4.1 (p-value= 0.01), hence rejecting the null of 
linearity. The Tsay test does not explicitly take into account distortions implied by the 
fact that the threshold parameter(s) are only identified under the alternative hypothesis, so 
when we implement the SETAR model in the next section, we use Hansen’s (1999a) 
approach to testing for nonlinearities in this framework.  
We also perform an indicative test for structural breaks. Table 2 presents the 
results of the Bai-Perron (2003) tests for structural change. The test indicates two 
structural breaks, at January 2003 and April 2005, and we therefore, in the next section, 
estimate a SETAR model for three sub-samples: January 1999 to January 2003; January 
2003 to April 2005; and April 2005 to January 2008.  Again, the Bai-Perron test is merely 
suggestive in this context, but it is consistent with the previous discussions of the visual 
examination of the data, and of policy changes implemented at these times. 
While Shah and Patnaik (2005, Table 4) list a host of incremental policy changes 
up to November 2004, the one that is most germane to our analysis was the removal of 
limits placed on foreign institutional investors in their hedging in the forward currency 
market. This took place in January 2003, the time of our first sample break. The second 
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sample break does not coincide with a specific policy change, but in April 2005, the RBI 
announced several small but significant measures to liberalize foreign exchange markets, 
in its Annual Policy Statement for 2005-06 (RBI, 2005, p. 10). 
Finally, Table 3 shows summary statistics for CIP deviations for the full and sub-
sample periods, where the sub-samples are determined by the Bai-Perron test discussed 
above. The largest negative deviation (foreign returns exceeding domestic returns) for the 
full sample is 7.88 percent per annum, and the largest positive deviation is 5.64 percent 
per annum. The mean absolute deviation is 1.85 percent per annum. There is quite a bit of 
variation across the subsamples. 
 
4. Self-Exciting Threshold Auto-Regression Tests of Capital Controls 
 
4.1 SETAR Methodology 
Deviations from CIP may exhibit non-linear properties that linear statistical 
methods are not able to model. In particular, the presence of transaction costs and capital 
controls are likely to create bands, within which arbitrage will not be profitable. Outside 
of the no-arbitrage boundaries, or threshold values, arbitrage profit opportunities will be 
operative, with the strength of the return to the no-arbitrage boundaries depending on the 
specifics of capital controls and other institutional factors.  The band threshold values and 
the speeds of adjustment above and below the bands may be asymmetric, reflecting the 
institutional specifics.  
Linear models of deviations from CIP fail to take into account the possibility of 
bands, with random deviations from CIP within the bands and systematic adjustment 
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towards CIP outside of the bands. The SETAR model is a particular class of piece-wise 
autoregressive models attributed to Tong (1978). Surveys of TAR and SETAR models,9 
respectively, are given by Potter (1999) and Hansen (1999b). The SETAR model may be 
seen as a parsimonious approximation of a general non-linear autoregressive model 
(Hansen, 1999b). The SETAR model is an appropriate statistical methodology for the 
problem we face in terms of bands and adjustment parameters. Various SETAR models 
have been used in modeling industrial production, GDP, unemployment and, in work 
closest to our own, on interest rate parity conditions (Pasricha, 2008) and cross-market 
premia (Levy Yeyati, Schmukler and Van Horen, 2006).10  
The Self-Exciting Threshold Autoregressive (SETAR) model that we estimate in 
this section allows for three regimes with differing autoregressive parameters and 
estimates the upper and lower thresholds which divide the three. In addition, we estimate 
the model over two regimes to reflect pre- and post-liberalization of capital controls.  
We implemented the following SETAR model: 
ptptptppt
ntntntnnt
ptnittit
κδεκδρκδ
κδεκδρκδ
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where tδ  is our onshore-offshore differential,   and pnijN jnt ,,),,0(~ 2 =σε nκ  and 
pκ are the negative and positive thresholds respectively. A model of this form assumes 
                                                 
9 As the names indicate, the SETAR model is a special case of the TAR model, in which regime-switch 
thresholds depend on lagged values of the autoregressive variable itself. 
10 Pasricha’s study (2008) uses SETAR models to measure deviations from interest rate parity in 11 
emerging market economies and, outside of crisis periods, assumes parameter stability. Levy Yeyati, 
Schmukler and Van Horen (2006) use data from nine emerging market economies to examine the ratio 
between the domestic and the international market price of cross-listed stocks, thereby providing a valuable 
measure of international financial integration. Note that the latter paper uses the general term TAR, but the 
model is in fact a SETAR model. 
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that within the bounds defined by nκ  and pκ , speculative activity is not profitable 
because of transactions costs and capital controls, so the differential inside the band may 
follow a unit root or otherwise non-stationary  process.  
With sufficiently strong arbitrage activity, however, the AR(1) process outside the 
bands will be stationary. This model assumes that speculative activity will push the 
deviations to the edges of the band, rather than to its center. If the thresholds were 
known, the model could be estimated by ordinary least squares applied separately to the 
inner and outer regime observations. The thresholds are not known, however, and we 
employ a grid search over possible threshold combinations. All the percentiles between 
the 5th and 95th percentiles are taken and separated into sets of negative and positive 
threshold candidates.11 The selected model is that combination of negative and positive 
threshold values that minimize the residual sum of squares. This estimation method is a 
type of constrained least squares, and yields estimates that are consistent (see Hansen, 
1999b and Pasricha, 2008). 
 
4.2 Model Choice 
 As indicated in the previous section, standard diagnostic tests have the maintained 
hypothesis of linearity, or do not take fully account of the implications of the non-linear 
alternative. In particular, the threshold parameter is not identified under a null hypothesis 
of linearity, so classical tests have non-standard distributions. Hansen (1996, 1999a) has 
                                                 
11 Thus, 5% was trimmed on each side. Every actual value of the CID between the 5th and 95th percentiles 
was used as a possible threshold in the unrestricted model. For the negative thresholds, the estimated values 
are not close to the cutoffs. For the positive, they are close to the 0-cutoff if the positive search is restricted 
to be between 0 and 95th percentile. 
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developed a bootstrapping procedure to simulate the asymptotic distribution of the 
likelihood ratio test. 
 Using Hansen’s approach, we test for the number of thresholds in the SETAR 
model. There are no thresholds (the standard linear model), one threshold, or two (the full 
model given in the expressions above). The tests are conducted pairwise, with the zero 
threshold null first being evaluated against the alternative of one threshold. If the null is 
rejected in that test, a second test is conducted for the null of one against the alternative 
of two thresholds. For the sample as a whole, the data reject both the linear model and the 
one-threshold model at the 5% level or better.  
However, when we applied the LR tests for the three sub-periods, we found that 
the null of one threshold was not rejected for the first period, and the null of a linear 
model was not rejected for the second or the third period. We believe that these results 
are somewhat driven by the low power of the tests.12 In particular, as we see in the next 
subsection, the results of estimating the two-threshold models for the three subperiods 
give very different results across the periods, in terms of behavior inside and outside the 
thresholds. Hence we prefer to report the two-threshold models, with their associated 
confidence intervals.13
 
4.2 SETAR Estimation Results 
                                                 
12 These results are available from the authors. Even if one accepts the implication of the tests that arbitrage 
thresholds have not been present in the latter part of our sample period, our overall conclusion that capital 
controls have weakened de facto remains intact. On the other hand, the two-threshold estimates we present 
here allow a more nuanced view on the evolution and impact of capital controls in the Indian case. 
13 As noted in Hansen (2000) in a related context, the statistical theory is asymptotic, and so may be less 
applicable to small samples, and the confidence intervals generated are also conservative. 
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The SETAR estimates are reported in Tables 4 and 5. We focus on the three sub-
samples, following evidence reported above of structural breaks indicating three distinct 
regimes. Estimates of the lower- and upper-thresholds, and the bandwidth (no-arbitrage 
zones), are reported for the full sample and three sub-samples in Table 4, along with the 
bootstrapped confidence intervals. The estimated speed of reversions and associated 
statistics for each sample are reported in Table 5. The columns in Table 5 labeled 
“OutObs,” “LCR” and “3rd  Quartile” refer, respectively, to (1) the percentage of 
observations that lie outside of the no-arbitrage band, (2) the longest continuous run 
outside of the band (i.e. the number of continuous observations), and (3) the third quartile 
of the number of weeks that any run outside of the threshold lasts. Figure 3 shows the 
results visually, with the upper and lower-thresholds shown for each sub-sample together 
with the speed of reversion parameters and each observation (deviations from CIP) 
plotted.  
In terms of the no-arbitrage zones estimates, controls on capital outflows were 
predominant in the January 1999 to January 2003 sample. Table 4 shows that the upper 
threshold is very close to zero percent (i.e. no net effective restrictions on capital 
inflows), and -4.28 percent for the lower threshold. (The bandwidth is 4.31). This 
indicates that foreign yields need to exceed domestic yields by 428 basis points 
(annualized) to induce capital outflows from India. When the lower threshold is 
exceeded, shown in Table 5, the speed of reversion is almost instantaneous. Arbitrage is 
slower above the upper threshold, with an estimated AR(1) parameter equal to 0.68. (32 
percent of the CIP yield differential in favor of domestic assets is closed within one 
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week).14 23 percent of the observations fall outside of the band (OutObs) and the longest 
continuous run outside of the band (LCR) is 11 weeks. However, 75 percent of deviations 
outside the band (3rd Quartile) are arbitraged away within two weeks.    
A large shift in Indian capital flows towards financial liberalization appears in the 
second sample, January 2003 to April 2005, with some effective restrictions now evident 
on capital inflows. The no-arbitrage band narrows appreciably to only 1.22 percent, with 
the lower threshold estimated to be near zero and the upper threshold estimated at 1.22 
percent. The AR(1) parameter (inversely related to the speed of adjustment) for CIP 
deviations above (below) the upper (lower) threshold is 0.80 (0.59). Arbitrage appears 
effective in eventually eliminating CIP deviations (outside the bands). Given the narrow 
bandwidth, it is not surprising that 84 percent of the observations fall outside of the no-
arbitrage zone and that the longest run outside of the band is 38 weeks. 75 percent of 
deviations outside the band are arbitraged away within four weeks.   
Capital controls appear to be intensified somewhat in the third sub-sample, April 
2005 to January 2008, and again are more restrictive on capital inflows. The bandwidth 
is 2.33 percent, the upper threshold is 1.59 and the lower threshold is -0.74. The speed of 
adjustment for deviations above the band increases sharply (the AR(1) parameter 
declines) in the third sub-sample, and is effectively instantaneous, while the speed of 
adjustment below the band also increases somewhat (AR(1)=0.45). 56 percent of the 
observations fall outside of the no-arbitrage zone and that the longest run outside of the 
band is 26 weeks. 75 percent of deviations outside the band are arbitraged away within 
four weeks.  
                                                 
14 An AR(1) parameter less than unity indicates mean reversion, i.e. CIP deviations outside of the band are 
eliminated. A zero AR(1) parameter indicates immediate reversion to the band.  
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Overall, the bandwidth is much narrower in the second and third sub-samples than 
in the first sample, indicating substantial de facto weakening of capital controls in India 
over the sample period.15 This finding is reflected in the summary statistics, shown in 
Table 1, which show the mean absolute CIP deviation has declined from 1.94 during 
January 1999-January 2003 to 1.32 during April 2005-January 2008. Moreover, the 
threshold estimates indicate a switch from strict controls on capital outflows in the early 
sample to moderate restrictions on inflows in the latter periods.16 Weak restrictions on 
inflows, possibly the result of transaction costs rather than capital controls, are also 
evident in the most recent sample period. All of the adjustment parameters indicate mean 
reversion to the upper or lower thresholds of the no-arbitrage band. These adjustments 
vary depending on whether the deviations are above or below the band and on the 
particular sub-sample.  
These changes in the speed of adjustment reflect the interaction of both capital 
controls and market structure/liquidity, but clearly indicate that strong forces for market 
arbitrage are evident that eliminate CIP deviations once they exceed a particular 
threshold. Average daily turnover of NDF contracts in the Indian Rupee increased from 
about US$35 million in mid-2001 to US$3.7 billion in early 2007 (Ma et al., 2004; Misra 
and Behera, 2006), indicating that market liquidity has increased markedly, with 
presumably stronger pressures for market arbitrage. Moreover, we would expect volume 
                                                 
15 This result is consistent with Ma and McCauley (2008) who regress the mean absolute deviations 
(weekly data) from CIP (12-month instruments) on three dummy variables representing different periods of 
time. The most recent period (July 2005-June 2008) has the lowest coefficient estimate, i.e. the lowest 
mean absolute value. Their sub-samples are not determined by structural break tests.  
16 For example, in 2007, increased portfolio inflows and FDI led to efforts by the Reserve Bank of India to 
limit capital inflows to avoid rupee appreciation, as well as a relaxation of restrictions on certain kinds of 
outflows. Expectations of rupee appreciation may be reflected in the sign of the CIP differential (Shah and 
Patnaik, 2005). Another component of policy during this period was the sterilization of inflows, resulting in 
reserve accumulation. 
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or quantity restrictions on capital inflows and outflows to have a larger impact on the 
speed of adjustment, while taxes on flows are more likely to increase bandwidths. The 
complex nature of Indian capital controls, discretionary application over time and their 
lack of transparency, do not allow us to disentangle these effects.  
 
5. Summary and Conclusions  
This paper has investigated the effectiveness of Indian capital controls in creating 
a wedge between domestic and foreign implied yields using NDF rates (deviations from 
CIP). Our objective is to test whether the incremental moves to liberalize India’s capital 
controls in recent years have effectively narrowed the barriers to capital inflows and 
outflows. In this context, we postulate the existence of no-arbitrage bands where the 
boundaries are determined by transactions costs and limitations to arbitrage due to capital 
controls, and CIP deviations are random within the boundaries. Using structural break 
tests, we divide the sample into three sub-samples and estimate the effects of 
liberalization on the threshold boundaries of the no-arbitrage band and speeds of 
adjustment. A narrowing of the bands over time is an indication of greater de facto capital 
account openness, as is an increase in the speed of adjustment to the band threshold 
points (indicating arbitrage acts more rapidly in returning the market closer to CIP). 
Inside of the bands, small deviations from CIP follow a process close to a random walk. 
Outside the bands, profitable and feasible arbitrage opportunities exist, and we estimate 
an adjustment process back towards the boundaries. We allow for asymmetric boundaries 
and asymmetric speeds of adjustment (above and below the band thresholds), which may 
vary depending on how arbitrage activity is constrained by capital controls.  
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We estimate this non-linear model with the self exciting threshold auto-
regressions (SETAR) methodology in order to simultaneously obtain consistent estimates 
of a non-arbitrage band (upper and lower threshold points) and speeds of adjustment 
(possibly asymmetric) to the boundaries. Outside the thresholds, all of our estimates 
indicate relatively rapid or instantaneous convergence. This pattern is consistent with the 
contention that capital controls imply a cost of arbitrage or induce riskiness to the 
arbitrage position. These unseen costs or risks induce a threshold effect where arbitrage 
will only become profitable (on a risk adjusted basis) outside a given level of CIP 
deviation.  
In terms of the effects of India’s liberalization of capital controls, our results 
indicate a significant reduction in the barriers to arbitrage from the pre-2003 period to the 
post-2003 period. Moreover, there has been a sharp switch in the direction of capital 
controls. In the pre-2003 period, controls were binding and substantial on capital 
outflows. Controls were reduced substantially after 2003 and the remaining restrictions 
(through early 2008) were mainly binding on capital inflows. In all regimes, we find that 
adjustment towards CIP is quite rapid outside of the threshold values. Overall, 
liberalization of capital controls in India has occurred in tandem with the development of 
domestic money and offshore markets and increases in market liquidity.  
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Table 1: ADF Unit Root Tests  
Variable                  Lags 
ADF 
Stat. p-value 
NDF  BIC 3 -2.28 0.18 
 AIC 8 -2.04 0.27 
MIBOR  BIC 0 -1.76 0.40 
 AIC 0 .. .. 
Onshore-Offshore Gap BIC 1 
-
4.96*** 0.00 
  AIC 8 -2.80* 0.06 
Notes: Lags chosen by BIC and AIC criterion, Null hypothesis is of unit root.  
* 10% ** 5% *** 1% level of significance. 
 
 
   
 
Table 2: Bai-Perron Tests 
 
SupFT(2|1) SupFT(3|2) SupFT(4|3) SupFT(5|4)    
20.49*** 12.71* 7.30 12.71      
Method   
Number of 
Breaks 
Selected 
  
Break Dates 
from 
Sequential 
Method(BP) 
90% 
Confidence 
Interval 
(pos.) 
90% 
Confidence 
Interval 
(neg.) 
    T1 CI+ CI- 
BIC  2  Jan-03 Mar-03 Nov-02 
Sequential 
(Bai 
Perron)  2  T2 CI+ CI- 
        Apr-05 Jun-05 Nov-04 
         
Notes: * 10% ** 5% *** 1% level of significance. The SupF(l+1|l) test is a sequential proceedure 
developed in Bai and Perron (2003) which tests for l+1 breaks vs. the null of l breaks. BIC is an 
information criteria selection procedure, dominated by the SupF but reported for interest. 
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Table 3: Summary Statistics,  
Onshore-Offshore Differential 
 
 Full Sample Jan 1999- Jan 2003 
Jan 2003 – 
April 2005 
April 2005 – 
Jan 2008 
Minimum -7.88 -7.88 -3.69 -4.69 
Maximum 5.64 1.58 5.54 3.86 
Mean Absolute Spread 1.85 1.94 2.26 1.32 
 
 
Table 4: Estimated No-Arbitrage Zones 
 
  Begin Date End Date Negative Positive Bandwidth R- 
   Threshold Threshold  squared 
       
Full Sample 30-Jan-99 30-Jan-08 -4.22 (-4.48, -2.17) 3.49 (0, 3.61) 8.10 0.60 
Sub Sample 1 30-Jan-99 11-Jan-03 -4.28 (-5.33, -2.51) 0.03 (0.03, 0.70) 4.31 0.68 
Sub Sample 2 25-Jan-03 2-Apr-05 -0.00 (-1.07, -0.00) 1.22 (0.30, 4.44) 1.22 0.61 
Sub Sample 3 16-Apr-05 30-Jan-08 -0.74 (-2.97, -0.00) 1.59 (0.00, 2.40) 2.33 0.14 
 
 
Notes: Thresholds estimated from SETAR models with one AR lag in each regime. A BIC criterion was employed for 
testing for optimal lags between 1 and 8 weeks. For all samples other than 3-month full sample, BIC criterion selected 
an AR(1) process. For 3-month full sample results, the BIC criterion selected 3 lags, but the BIC statistics for 1 and 3 
lags were almost identical. We chose lag 1 for consistency with the other models.  
 
 
Table 5: Speed of Reversion Statistics 
 
  OutObs LCR 3rd AR Coefficients 
 (%)  Quartile Inner Regime Negative Positive 
        AR(1) Std Error AR(1) Std Error AR(1)  Std Error 
          
Full Sample 11 7 3 0.89 0.03 -0.10 0.16 -0.04 0.30 
Sub Sample 1 23 11 2 1.00 0.05 -0.11 0.16 0.68 0.28 
Sub Sample 2 84 38 4 1.64 0.33 0.59 0.22 0.80 0.07 
Sub Sample 3 56 26 4 0.67 0.22 0.45 0.12 0.01 0.29 
Notes: OutObs is the percentage of deviations in the outer regimes. LCR is the longest continuous run outside any threshold and 3rd 
Quartile is the third quartile of continuous runs outside thresholds. Non-positive parameter values for the AR(1) coefficients would 
indicate instantaneous convergence to the threshold – none of the negative estimates . 
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Figure 1: CIP deviation series 
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Figure 2: Plot of AR(1) parameter from rolling regressions on CIP deviation series  
Two-year (104 weeks) rolling regression windows (dotted lines are +/-95% errors) 
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Figure 3: CIP Differentials – Estimated Thresholds 
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